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IT is certainly true to-day that there is a lamentable want of in-
terest in some, and, indeed, in most of the higher things of life.
This fact is, in the main, due to the over-emphasis which is being laid
upon natural objects at the expense of ideal objects, which are
relegated to the background of consciousness, and are given but a
shadowy kind of reality. Of course this is ncjt, in some senses,
peculiar to our age: the phenomenon of man clinging closely to
natural objects is the story of the human world on the whole in the
entire march of its evolutionary life. The result of this close af-
finity with natural objects has kept the mind constantly on the
level of the senses: and. speaking generally of the average human
life, there is onl\- a minimum of intelligence recjuired in this mode
of activity. The interest in the external world may become so in-
tense—and is. I think, actually so—that whole realms of reality
hardly exist for the \ast majority of mankind even in civilized coun-
tries. These domains of realit}- which are outside their ken are the
most important ones. Certainly this is the conviction of all those who
have realized in some degree the reality of the world of ideal objects.
15ut if there have been no attempts, or onl\ feeble attempts, to enter
the second realm, what that second realm contains does not exist
in any effective way in the mind simply because it has been swamped
by the over-emphasis which is being laid on the objects which lend
themselves to the senses. As I shall try to show, objects in the
external world play an all-important ])art in human life, and human
life, in its turn, plays an all-important part auKjng the objects of
the physical world.
Thus we pass to the statement that objects in the external world
are in no sense to be ignored. It is fundamental for the develop-
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ment of the liigher life that not a single step backward be taken
with regard to any object which lends itself to the senses. A
knowledge of such objects constitutes the true and necessary "jump-
ing-ofif ground" to the higher le\els of life. Much of the advance-
ment of the Natural Sciences has come about in this way of keeping
the natural object constantly in front of ourselves and allowing
concentration of attention to do its work upon it. But it is often
forgotten that niiud is a work in all this. And not only is it forgot-
ten, but the insistence and pertinacity of the sense or senses used
are so strong, and make the object so alluring, that there is the very
natural tendency of conceding realit\' to natural objects and to them
alone. The consequence of this is that people become content to
remain on this empirical level, and some go so far as to state that
the search for an}'thing behind and beyond this is hunting after
phantoms. I am only hinting at this point of the investigation that
in all this there is present something of value and significance.
At the present stage it ma\' be pointed out that one is apt to for-
get how much that is mental is present and included in our per-
ception of natural objects. To those acquainted with the Theory
of Knowledge all this is a truism. 15ut it is not a truism to state
that a vast amount of inattention is to be found on the side of de-
scribing and explaining what takes place from the side of the mental
structure of life in the very act of becoming aware and of knowing
any object in the external w'orld. Add to this the nature of what
is happening when the object has ceased to be present to the senses
and yet is still present to self-consciousness. Let us return for a
moment to one of the facts enumerated above, i.e. the forgetfulness
of how much that is mental in the perception of the natural object.
All idealistic thinkers (and, I suppose, nearly all empirical thinkers)
are agreed that the consciousness of the object is mental ; that any
axioms and postulates which enter into the meaning of the object
are also mental ; and that the totality of the impressions do enter, in
some mysterious kind of wa}-, into a realm which lies beneath the
sensory level. It is of course true that reference may be continually
necessary to the natural object as an actvial existence in a w^orld
outside consciousness. Still the meaning is within consciousness.
It certainly takes the ordinary individual a long time to become
aware of this fact. And even cultivated men very often are only
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partial]} aware of it. An eminent Trofessor in Jena once told me
that Haeckel had been so long looking at things outside himself
that he had come at last to forget entirely that there was anything
at all happening inside himself. The temptation to the i)roduction
of such a type of mind is very natural to those who are constantly
engaged with objects and their behaviour in the external world.
Thus it may be said that it is not merely the naive mind that needs
supplementary ideal objects to enrich the physical ones, but also the
man of science is often in need of a constant reminder in the same
direction. The result of this constant monopol}' of the object is to
relegate the remainder of life to a subsidiary place, l-'irst things
are placed second, and second thing,s placed first. My contention is
that the backwardness of mankind concerning the fundamental
meanings and values of life is due entirely to this. The natural
tendenc\- is to keep peri)etually on the lc\el of the //;;;;// as it pre-
sents itself to one or other of the sense. Conse(iuentl\' to-da}- we
witness the failure to grasp the meaning of an}- object outside its
immediate effect upon us.
I have already referred to the fact that such a trait as T have
mentioned is present even in men of science. By an increased in-
terest in the ])hysical object the mind is continuall\' forced into con-
sidering the empirical aspect as the one of fundamental importance,
and thus forgetting more important aspects and attempting to trans-
form mental constructions of various kinds into objects which exist
in the world without. That is one of the great illusions which
governs much of the natural science of the present day. Ikit if all
scientists had remained on such a level mathematics and the more
conceptual sciences (e. g. mechanics and physics ) would be in a very
bad way to-day ; it may even be stated that they would never have
arisen. This is not the place to show the hypothetical and conceptual
character of the Physics of a Xewton or of an Einstein. And it is
out of the neglect of the meaning and significance of the world of
ideal objects that so much criticism has been levelled at some of the
most important elements in Einstein's Theories of Relativity.
Some of the countries of the world are only too jjrone to live,
on the whole, on the em]:)irical level, unconsciously ignoring the im-
pressions which the external objects make upon self-consciousness
in its fulness of meaning. Of course it is most fortunate that the
mind does much of this abstract work, which has to be constantly
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connected with physical objects, without awareness of what is
actually included in our knowledge of physical reality. But the
question ma\' be legitimatel\- asked. How much more comprehensive
and how much richer would the reality be if the awareness of what
lies beneath the impression of the physical object were actually
present ?
It is of fundamental importance to bear in mind that we are
deceiving ourselves when we imagine that, in our examination of
anything in the external world, there is none more present to self-
consciousness than the impressions of the bare object. Xo object
lends itself to any of the senses in its entirety. I have touched on
this point in an earlier part of this paper, but it is necessary to re-
peat it on account of the fact that important consequences follow
from such a fact. I am aware, of course, that the fact is a well
known psychological one, but that it is something greatly more than
this is far too often forgotten. We are certain that some element of
what the object means is to be found in the concept of the object.
The concept of elements of an object cannot possibly be the same as
the mere perceptual view of the object. Something is abstracted
from. the object, and this something becomes another kind of object,
i. e. a mental one within consciousness itself. The concept which
we possess of any object may be of an elementary kind, and generally
is so in the initial stages of every investigation. But as the investiga-
tion proceeds in a perceptual way, more and more elements or as-
pects of the object are passed on into the concept. And, what is
often overlooked, other elements or aspects still which are not
actually present in perception—and, consequently, absent from the
object—are present in the concept and these in their turn work upon
the conceptual elements which have issued directly from the percep-
tual elements. Thus ever richer concepts are formed : these become
objects in consciousness, and these cannot possibly have a counter-
part in any objects in the world without. Into the formation of such
objects in consciousness the perceptual elements have made their
contribution, but it is a contribution which has to be compounded
into the prior conceptual knowledge and experience that were al-
ready present. Aly main point here is to emphasize the fact that
such a contribution of objects in consciousness is apt to be over-
looked or, in any case, is apt to be referred back continually to the
perceptual level. Certainl\- such a procedure as this is legitimate
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and al)S()lutely necessary in connection with tlie description and ex-
planation of all objects in the external world. Hut all this is very
different frf)ni nierel\- {i^rantin^^ an existence to such (jbjects within
consciousness only in so far as the\ are related and referred back
continually to the external world. The objects in consciousness, as
already j)ointed out, are something more than a replica of objects
perceived. It looks then as if we were in a world of another kind
of "dimension" than the external world. Certainly the external
world has made its contribution. 1 am ready to go so far a.s to say
that the objects in consciousness would have had no existence (at
least in a physical world like ours ) had it not been for the impres-
sions which objects in a physical sense make upon us. I'ut the story
only begins there. Something which is not physical but conceptual
is called up to observe, to reflect upon, and to transmute all the ma-
terial that enters through the various avenues of the senses.
When we look into the matter of the nature and workings of the
mind we discover such a process of transmution occuring. and it
occurs not only by means of the im])ressions of objects upon self-
consciousness but also by means of a conceptual power in man work-
ing upon the material that enters. It is in this sense then that it is
stated that Ideal objects are created by mind. There is no need of
rej)eating that they are not created out of nothing. We may then
accept with Ilusserl's School of Phenomenology the statement that
alongside of the existence ( Dasein ) of objects there is their sub-
sistence or their heinii as they are ( Sosein or Wesensschau ). This
means that alongside of the perception of natural objects we obtain
a still more inward perception of the Sosein or IVcsensschau of
objects. In this latter aspect the relation of the object to conscious-
ness is not now taken into account. What is taken into account is
the conceptual meaning itself of any object as it exists in conscious-
ness. We are certain then that the ideal object exists or subsists in
self-consciousness, and it is what it is—no more and no less. There
is nothing very mysterious about all this. It is all a certitude. But,
as I have pointed out at an earlier stage, the trouble begins when
no kind of reality is conceded to the ideal objects, and when it is
believed that such objects have no function whatever to perform
save to be referred back to the external world. The main object of
this article is to concede a reality to the ideal objects of a "dimen-
sion" other than that of physical things. The failure to do this— i. e
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the failure to take the Sosciii or ideahty of objects in consciousness
—
has been the main cause of the lamentably slow progress of humanity
in all kinds of directions. The matter we are dealing with here
belongs to the realms of the Theory of Knowledge and of Psy-
chology, but it is not confined to such realms. It has consequences
of a practical nature—consequences which affect the whole progress
of the human race. Let me turn to this point.
In what a fragmentary, elementary stage we should be in to-day
had it not been for this passage from Dasein to Sosein—from
physical to ideal objects! Wherever and whenever such a passage
has taken place, a further stage of development was reached, because
the truth in itself and not merely in its relations with physical objects
was taken into account. Suppose for a moment that the idealism of
a Socrates and a Plato had never entered this world of ours. It
would be impossible for us to conceive of the advancement of man
in knowledge and in recognition of the most valuable things of life.
There is no need of multiplying instances. It is sufficient to state
that it is by means of conceptual and ideational experiences that man
has been able to shape his life into a domain of civilization, culture,
morality, and religion. This could not possibly have happened with-
out man conceiving and feeling in some very deep kind of way that
his experiences meant what they stated in his deepest self-conscious-
ness. If he had granted to such experiences no reality other than is
to be found in their reference back to levels of perception and to
objects existing in a physical world outside his consciousness he
would never have achieved what has already been gained.
Turning to the need of affirming the reality of ideal objects, in
all their meaning, value, and comprehensiveness, and of working
them out in life, we may ask the question, what objection can there
be for professed teachers of science, philosophy, and religion to
accept the doctrine of the ideality of all knowledge and experience?
An atmosphere could thus be created within a generation which
could be breathed by vast numbers of people concerning the meaning,
value, and significance of the things of the spirit. Radical changes
are at present needful in the personal applications of all forms of
knowledge. In Natural Science, it is generally felt that there is no
need to deal w-ith the purely epistemological and metaphysical ele-
ments. It is probably true that so many men of science are pure
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novices in the Theory of Knowledj^^e. The result is that their
methods and conclusions are nearly always of an almost empirical
nature. In Philosophy it is often the same. Metaphysics and its
allied sister, Logic, do not obtain the place they deserve in the
writings of many professional teachers. The result is that Truth
and Principles are very largely discarded for scraps of knowledge
which have a biological and physiological connection. Of course
this kind of work is necessary, but the time has more than arrived
when it should be supplemented by something more substantial and
more closely allied to the deepest needs of human life. Matters do
not seem ver\- much better, but in some sense worse, when we con-
sider the methods of teachers of religion. Here the training has
dealt with material of a very doubtful nature. An acceptation of
the great creeds of Christendom may leave the religious teacher
absolutely blind to the vast mass of knowledge that has already
accumulated on the fields of science and philosophy. It is only here
and there that we discover an\thing more than a naive kind of ac-
quaintance with all this. Is it then a wonder that an increasing
section of the community in all the civilized countries of the world
—and this section often the more intelligent one—has drifted from
organised religion and has lost its anchorage of the great and per-
manent values of life? Many teachers of religion are conscious of
this fact, and confess that they do not know where to turn for a solu-
tion. The solution seems to me to lie in granting a reality to the
contents of experience and of conceiving of these as constituting an
order of existence other than the order of the physical world. It is
a tremendous help for man to realise that he is in possession of a
nature that is not only capable of interpreting the world without,
but that it also includes a real kind of mental and spiritual existence
or subsistence which will carry him onward and upward to ever
higher realms of thought and feeling and action.
The justification for taking into consideration ideal objects in
their ever increasing depth and comprehensiveness is, I hope, thus
seen to be the main problem to-day. It is an actual mode of pene-
tration nearer to the heart of reality. It must not be taken as any
form of delusion. As I have tried to show, it is the meaning which
ideal objects grant us that interprets the world and passes beyond
it. The warrant for proceeding in this manner may be found in the
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nature of man himself wiienever that nature comes to an awakening.
In the awakening nature of man there is always to be found a need
of completion ( Erganzungbediirfnis ) as Frege and Husserl show.
Although by these two men the "need of completion" is taken in a
logical sense, still I believe that it applies also to man's whole nature.
The mind has needs and demands beyond physical existence. I)y
obliging the dictates of these needs and demands the mind tills the
gaps left by perception. To such an awakening nature, to live on
the level of perception is impossible. This does not mean that we
expect to discover an}'thing which is idealistic in the unfilled gaps
of science. But it does mean that mind is so made as to complete
more and more, without end. the meaning and experience of reality.
The pathway of ideal objects is not confined to a Theory of
Knowledge or to branches of the Natural Sciences. The ever
greater completion of the meaning of reality has other "needs of
completion" within the realms of Psychology, Logic. Ethics. Meta-
physics, and Religion. Thus we discover various levels which the
"need of completion" has to pass through. As the various steps of
this hierarchy of the sciences are scaled the ideal objects within self-
consciousness become more and more comprehensive and significant.
Also, the content becomes more and more unseen and spiritual, and
there is no final goal discernible in front of the individual or of the
race in the transmutation of reality. Why, then, concede reality to
the elementary stages of the ascent and deny it to the more advanced
ones ? I am bound to say that I cannot understand why. It is the
advanced stages which have made the world what it is on its physical
side and on every other side. The final goal, as already stated, is
not in sight ; and, further, is not to be conceived in any perceptual,
pictorial sense. But we proceed b\' taking each object as it is on its
own level and meaning, and passing on and on to its further meaning
and significance. If such a mode of viewing things can be presented
in as simple and intelligible way as possible to mankind I believe that
a universal response will be found among many men and women of
ability and good-will. And thus we win them to a form of religion
which will be constant in its nature, and which will view phvsical
existence as preliminary to the formation of the realit\- of the
"second dimension" found within self-consciousness, and ever deep-
ening there as an experience of the things of the spirit. At the
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same time the "forward \ie\v"—the "need of completion"—will con-
stantly pass from natural objects to ideal ones, and when the j^assage
backward to natural objects is taken, as it will have constantly to
be taken, it will cast its halo and glory even on the natural objects
themselves. It is something of this nature that seems to me to be
the legitimate outcome of all branches of science, histor\-. philoso])hy.
and religion.
